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2009 MICH. ST. L. REv. 273
Because I do not believe we are born with a taste for jury trials or the Australian
ballot, I must assume that our institutions play some role in establishing our aes-
thetic principles in these matters. The Constitution is first among such institutions.
And yet we must apply to it, in its construction, the very standards it teaches us,
knowing that even as we do so we are creating a changed institution which will, in
turn, change us.I
Every human society is an enterprise of world-building. Religion occupies a dis-
tinctive place in this enterprise. . . . Society is a product of man. It has no other
being except that which is bestowed upon it by human activity and consciousness.
There can be no social reality apart from man. Yet it may also be stated that man
is a product of society.... The two statements, that society is the product of man
and that man is the product of society, are not contradictory. They rather reflect
the inherently dialectic character of the societal phenomenon. 2
Religious communities and constitutional ones have long wrestled
with a similar task-remaining faithful to an authoritative text created to
embody principles that would give guidance to a developing community.
Both communities are built on the texts they hold dear. And the interpreta-
tion of both texts develops over time, mirroring changes in the societies that
revere them.
Understandably then, for both our religious traditions and our constitu-
tional tradition, issues of hermeneutics and the solving of various exegetical
problems lie at the heart of the interpretative enterprise. And over the years,
a substantial body of literature has developed exploring methodological
similarities and differences between constitutional and scriptural interpreta-
tion.3 This area of study has long interested academics, although recent
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works (such as the late Jaroslav Pelikan's book, Interpreting the Bible and
the Constitution) have given it renewed prominence.4
The papers in this collection approach the topic from a variety of van-
tage points, and they take us in a variety of directions. Ronald Garet ex-
plains how the Biblical narratives of creation, redemption, and revelation
are at play throughout American constitutional history, drawing on the work
of scholars like Franz Rosenzweig, and placing special importance on how
this last narrative-revelation-has been a hidden but important theme
throughout our constitutional history.5 Sam Levine focuses on the presump-
tion against superfluity, a technique common to interpretation of both the
Torah and the Constitution. Levine explains how scholars have seen deep
meaning in the Torah's text, even in passages that they claim lack any direct
application. Turning then to the Ninth Amendment, Levine suggests an
alternative understanding of that often-ignored constitutional provision-
one where the Ninth Amendment does not itself create any individual rights,
but nevertheless provides certain normative guidance for the interpretation
of other constitutional provisions.6
Patrick Brennan opens with a discussion of natural law theory, and in
particular, the issue of whether judges are empowered to implement the
natural law directly, without any legislative authorization. Brennan turns to
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,7 understand-
ing it as requiring that administrative agencies act with a certain measure of
deliberation and fairness in order to be entitled to deference by courts. Tak-
ing the two together, Brennan offers insights on the nature of the judicial
role.8 Asifa Quraishi considers the ways in which an understanding of Is-
lamic law-and, in particular, an understanding of the institutional role of
the qadi-can offer insight into American constitutional law. Beginning
with an exploration of the different ways in which the two systems approach
concepts like fallibility and finality, her paper in due time thoughtfully
touches upon the most recent and pressing issues in our constitutional socie-
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ty-from originalism to legal realism to the counter-majoritarian difficulty.9
Finally, Jay Mootz considers the overlap between legal and religious her-
meneutics-not in the sense of how they relate to each other, but rather in
the sense of how both exemplify the common elements of interpretation.
The first part of Mootz's paper focuses on how the faithful do hermeneutics,
using the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer to show how, in a sense, hermeneu-
tics can only be done by the faithful. The second part incorporates these
insights to ponder what it means for hermeneutics to be done faithfully,
paying special attention to the work of Gianni Vattimo and then-Cardinal
Joseph Ratzinger.10
9. See Asifa Quraishi, On Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps
Me Understand American Constitutional Law, 2009 MICH. STATE L. REV. 339 (2009).
10. See Francis J. Mootz III, Faithful Hermeneutics, 2009 MICH. STATE L. REV. 361
(2009).
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